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16 June 1977

NOTE FOR: Mr. Robert R. Bowie, D/DCI/NI

FROM: A/NIO/EAP

SUBJECT: Admiral Turner's Korea Testimony

1. Yesterday you asked that I draft a list of questions of the kind the DCI might expect from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. They are attached.

2. I have begun the flow of reading material to the DCI. But as you and I agreed yesterday, it would be more beneficial if the DCI could sit down and informally discuss -- and argue -- salient points with a few desk analysts. I recommend you approach the DCI with an offer to get this small group of analysts together.

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Attachment:
As Stated

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1. What are North Korea's national goals?
2. What is Pyongyang's view of:
 - US ground forces in South Korea?
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 - The withdrawal of US ground forces?
3. What are the elements that have thus far deterred a North Korean attack?
4. What is the military balance on the Korean peninsula today? What will the balance be five years from now?
5. Will not the removal of US ground forces introduce an element of uncertainty and possible instability on the Korean peninsula? Might this not increase the chances of war? How are the South Koreans -- both critics and supporters of President Pak -- reacting to the withdrawal? In your view, what -- if any -- are the particularly sensitive aspects of the US withdrawal from the South Korean perspective?
6. Won't the Soviet Union and the PRC --as well as Japan and our other allies in Asia -- see the US withdrawal as a general American retreat from its position as the pre-eminent Pacific power? Are any of these countries' policies vis-a-vis Korea and the US likely to change appreciably as a result? If so, how?

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- 2 -

7. Did the President have available to him the Intelligence Community's appraisal of the Korea situation before the decision was made to withdraw US ground forces?
8. Can you judge the impact within the policy community of the Intelligence Annex to PRM 13? Did the President discuss with you the assessment?
9. Was the Intelligence Community tasked to examine the risks before the final decision was made to withdraw US ground forces?
10. In your view, what are the risks? Are they acceptable? What might be done to offset them? In your view, are there compensating actions on our part that are vital for ensuring a successful ground force withdrawal?
11. A recent CIA briefing presented to our staff suggested that the US and South Korea together could probably do little to redress the military balance over the next five years. Could you clarify this?

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